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ABSTRACT 
American agriculture is inexorably concentrating into the hands of 
a small number of large conglomerates. Expanding farms pursuing 
scale economies would normally have to abide by a system of 
environmental and other laws that would, in theory, require farms to 
account for negative externalities. If those laws were observed and 
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enforced, they would help strike a balance between the greater 
profitability and the larger externalities of scaling up. But these laws 
are not widely observed nor rigorously enforced, which upsets this 
balance and gives large-scale farms a cost advantage while insulating 
them from corresponding responsibilities. 
Perhaps nowhere in agriculture is this tension more visible than in 
the hog industry, which has dramatically transformed itself from one 
based on small-scale, localized production to one based on large-
scale, far-flung production. Ninety-six percent of all hogs raised in the 
United States are now raised on farms of one thousand or more hogs. 
Thus far, however, the American legal and regulatory systems have 
not appropriately managed this staggering growth. Lax enforcement 
of environmental laws against large hog farms has allowed them to 
grow and realize scale economies without accounting for their 
exponential increase in water and air pollution. The same can be said 
for state right-to-farm laws, which insulate many large hog farms 
from nuisance lawsuits. Further, reckless practices in concentrated 
animal feeding operations contribute to the development of dangerous 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria and heighten the risk of a transfer of 
zoonotic diseases to humans—potentially helping to set the stage for 
the next pandemic. Finally, the risks of this lax legal structure are not 
only related to environmental and health concerns. The concentration 
of hog farming imposes economic costs by reducing competition and 
variety, all in the pursuit of lower consumer prices that may or may 
not be actually achieved in the long run. Large agricultural 
conglomerates should be held to account for these enormous costs, 
not only because these costs outweigh the productivity benefits, but 
also because they serve to marginalize small farmers and 
fundamentally change the nature of farming. 
INTRODUCTION 
merican agriculture is changing at an astonishing pace. While 
agricultural production historically took place on a vast, 
sprawling potpourri of independent farms, the engine of modern 
production is a consolidated network of efficient, cost-conscious, and 
interrelated operations. No longer predominantly small and family-
run, farms are now more typically managed by large and sophisticated 
business organizations with many key decisions made at corporate 
headquarters, far removed from the farm itself. American agriculture 
has taken on qualities that are considerably more industrial than its 
A
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less mechanized past. As part of this process, agricultural production 
has also become concentrated in large and sophisticated business 
organizations. In terms of production, the iconic small, independent 
family farm has become a mere souvenir of American history. 
What accounts for this increasing industrialization and 
concentration of agricultural production? Certainly part of it is the 
natural economic evolution of an industry, as it realizes efficiencies 
and economies of scale.1 And at least part of the trend can be 
attributed to continuing American agricultural policy centering upon 
subsidies. Not only are agricultural subsidies allocatively inefficient,2 
but they have contributed to the historic concentration of the 
agricultural sector as small-scale farms are replaced by larger, scale-
intensive farms.3 It is not merely that subsidy payments are 
 
1 CAROLYN DIMITRI ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., THE 20TH 
CENTURY TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. AGRICULTURE AND FARM POLICY 6 (2005), 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/259572/eib3_1_.pdf. 
2 See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Inefficient Redistribution, 95 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 649, 649 (2001) (“In all these cases, it is difficult to argue that the 
particular form of the policy is correcting a market failure. Rather, it seems aimed simply 
at redistributing income. For instance, no scholars appear to argue that price supports for 
farmers, which have the effect of increasing farm output, promote efficiency because 
without them there would be too few resources in agriculture. . . . Instead, it is widely 
agreed that price supports are simply a way to raise farmers’ incomes. If this is correct, 
then they are Pareto inefficient in the sense that farm incomes could be maintained, and 
everyone else made better off, by a form of redistribution that did not involve resource 
misallocation. A simple transfer to raise the income of the farmers by as much as the 
inefficient policy yields would constitute an actual Pareto improvement.”); Wilfrid Legg, 
Presidential Address Agricultural Subsidies: Measurement and Use in Policy Evaluation, 
54 J. AGRIC. ECON. 175, 177 (2003) (“The result was a major OECD study, National 
Policies and Agricultural Trade, published in 1987, which led to Ministers agreeing in that 
same year to a set of actions and principles for the reform of agricultural policies. 
Countries agreed to progressively reduce agricultural subsidies and allow for a greater 
influence of market signals in guiding production decisions, while recognising [sic] that 
countries might also need to take non-economic objectives into account. Forging 
consensus among countries on the sensitive issue of agricultural policy reform in an 
international context is a painstaking process. The agreement to cut subsidies, coupled 
with the powerful signal to increase the ‘market orientation’ of agriculture was qualified 
by the potential catch-all of the option to take ‘non-economic objectives’ into 
account.”(footnote omitted)); Gordon C. Rausser, Predatory Versus Productive 
Government: The Case of U.S. Agricultural Policies, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 135 (1992) 
(“[M]uch of this [agricultural] legislation became a vehicle for codifying rent-seeking 
behavior. Examples of such agricultural policy evolution briefly described here include 
western resource and water development, soil conservation, environmental pesticide 
policy, and farm credit.”). 
3 See, e.g., LAURENT PIET ET AL., HOW DO AGRICULTURAL POLICIES INFLUENCE 
FARMLAND CONCENTRATION? THE EXAMPLE OF FRANCE 2–3 (2010), https://www 
researchgate net/publication/46471353_How_do_agricultural_policies_influence_farm 
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concentrating in fewer hands as the logical result of there being fewer 
hands to receive them. Rather, agricultural subsidies themselves are 
actively precipitating the rise of mega-farms at the expense of small 
farms.4 A U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) economic study 
found that between 1987 and 2002, one-third to one-half of all farm 
concentration could be attributed to government subsidies.5 That is to 
say, without government subsidies, farm concentration would still be 
occurring, but more slowly. 
If agricultural subsidies account for one-third to one-half of 
concentration, what accounts for the rest? Missing from this economic 
discussion is the role of law in creating an increasingly concentrated 
agricultural sector. Generous and inefficient federal subsidies are only 
a part of the policy machinery that grinds small farms down to 
novelty status and paves the way for large agricultural conglomerates 
to take up the lost productive capacity. Legal rules—or more 
accurately, the lack thereof—have contributed to concentration by 
allowing large farms to take advantage of scale economies while 
externalizing the costs of their larger, bulked-up operations. Large 
farms enjoying scale economies make larger profits. Normally these 
farms would also have to abide by a system of land use, 
environmental, and other laws requiring them to account for their 
social and environmental costs. If those laws were observed and 
enforced, they would help strike a balance between greater 
profitability and larger externalities. But these laws are not widely 
observed and not rigorously enforced, upsetting this balance and 
giving large-scale farms cost advantages while insulating them from 
corresponding responsibilities. 
 
land_concentration_The_example_of_France (discussing similar effects of similar policies 
in France); Michael J. Roberts & Nigel Key, Agricultural Payments and Land 
Concentration: A Semiparametric Spatial Regression Analysis, 90 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 
627, 640 (2008); Simone Severini & Antonella Tantari, The Impact of Agricultural Policy 
on Farm Income Concentration: The Case of Regional Implementation of the CAP Direct 
Payments in Italy, 44 AGRIC. ECON. 275, 284 (2013) (concluding that a direct payment 
policy reduced the concentration of farm ownership caused by past agricultural subsidies); 
Justin Spittler et al., The Economic Impact of Agricultural Subsidies in the United States, 
36 J. SOC. POL. & ECON. STUD. 301, 305 (2011). 
4 Nigel D. Key & Michael J. Roberts, Do Government Payments Influence Farm Size 
and Survival?, 32 J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 330, 346 (2007) (“Government payments 
were found to be positively associated with the likelihood of farm survival, and the 
magnitude of this association was generally greater for larger farms. Also, a small but 
statistically significant positive association was found between payments and farm size 
growth, and the magnitude of this effect increased with the size of the operation.”); 
Roberts & Key, supra note 3, at 627. 
5 Roberts & Key, supra note 3, at 640. 
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Perhaps nowhere in agriculture are these trends more visible than 
in the hog industry. Over the past three decades, the American hog 
industry has undergone a remarkable transformation from one based 
on small-scale, localized production to one based on large-scale, 
decentralized production.6 American hog farming has become 
concentrated in the sense that a handful of large corporations now 
own the vast majority of hogs raised in the United States.7 But hog 
farming has also become decentralized in the sense that different 
phases of hog raising are now frequently delegated to different farms. 
Instead of raising a hog from birth to slaughter, large livestock 
conglomerates contract out different phases of hog production to 
individual hog farms, but maintain tight control over the entire 
process from birth to slaughter to processing to marketing.8 This has 
achieved some gains in efficiency because different phases of hog 
raising require slightly different sets of expertise. This modern and 
newly efficient American hog industry has produced record-low 
consumer prices9 and become an export juggernaut, elevating the 
United States from a bit player in international markets to the largest 
pork exporter in the world.10 
The massive scaling-up of hog production, however, has come with 
a heavy environmental and social price tag. The restructuring of hog 
production to occur almost exclusively on large, industrialized, 
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs),11 has introduced a 
number of environmental problems that were insignificant when 
production was dominated by smaller farms.12 Farms expanding to 
take advantage of economies of scale are able to lower their average 
 
6 PEW COMM’N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD., PUTTING MEAT ON THE TABLE: 
INDUSTRIAL FARM ANIMAL PRODUCTION IN AMERICA 5–6 (2008) [hereinafter PEW], 
http://www ncifap.org/_images/PCIFAPFin.pdf. 
7 Id. (The chicken industry is even more integrated and concentrated than hog farms, 
whereas the dairy and beef cattle industries are less so.). 
8 WILLIAM D. MCBRIDE & NIGEL KEY, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH 
SERV., U.S. HOG PRODUCTION FROM 1992 TO 2009: TECHNOLOGY, RESTRUCTURING, 
AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 5–8 (2013), http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1207987/err 
158.pdf. 
9 Id. at 33–34. 
10 Hogs & Pork: Pork Exports, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/animal-products/hogs-pork/trade.aspx#exports (last 
updated Mar. 24, 2015). 
11 Regulatory Definitions of Large CAFOs, Medium CAFO, and Small CAFOs, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/sector_table.pdf (last visited Oct. 
23, 2015) (providing working definitions of what constitutes a CAFO). 
12 See discussion infra Part II. 
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costs as production volume increases.13 But the opposite is true of the 
harm from pollution. Pollution costs increase exponentially with 
volume, so that the marginal harm from the five thousandth cow, hog, 
or chicken is greater than that from the tenth cow, hog, or chicken.14 
Farm size expansion is thus a mixed bag of higher profits and greater 
social harms. Environmental and land use laws are supposed to 
provide a check on the uncontrolled growth of livestock operations, 
ensuring that the negative externalities of larger livestock farms are 
commensurate with the economic benefits. But these environmental 
and land use laws have been neutered and their countervailing 
influences erased, allowing large livestock operations, such as hog 
CAFOs, to flourish. 
The forgiveness of these environmental insults is a matter of 
common agricultural and environmental policy15 as well as an 
obvious subsidy for large hog CAFOs. What is less obvious is that 
environmental laxity, as applied to large hog CAFOs, actually injures 
smaller hog farms and is helping to drive them out of existence. Most 
individual hog farmers have become outside contractors, providing 
the large firms with facilities and waste management services, but 
little of the knowledge and animal husbandry that characterized 
traditional hog farming. The implicit legal bias towards large CAFOs 
has marginalized all operations that do not fall under this category. 
Under the patina of defending the bucolic farm life, large agricultural 
conglomerates have actually decimated farming life to make room for 
CAFOs. Nowhere has this been more sharply illustrated than in hog 
farming. 
This Article examines five areas of law which have biased hog 
production towards larger, more intensive farms: (1) state right-to-
farm laws, (2) the Clean Water Act, (3) the Clean Air Act, (4) Food 
 
13 ROBERT A. HOPPE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF ARGIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., SMALL 
FARMS IN THE UNITED STATES: PERSISTENCE UNDER PRESSURE 28 (2010), http://www 
.ers.usda.gov/media/147007/eib63_1_.pdf. 
14 See, e.g., David Letson et al., Point/Nonpoint Source Trading for Controlling 
Pollutant Loadings to Coastal Waters: A Feasibility Study, in THEORY, MODELING AND 
EXPERIENCE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF NONPOINT-SOURCE POLLUTION 123, 127 (Clifford 
S. Russell & Jason F. Shogren eds., 1993) (modeling the convex damage function); James 
S. Shortle & James W. Dunn, The Relative Efficiency of Agricultural Source Water 
Pollution Control Policies, 68 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 668, 670 (1986) (modeling a water 
quality damage function as being convex, or increasing nonlinearly); Rodney B.W. Smith 
& Theodore D. Tomasi, Transaction Costs and Agricultural Nonpoint-Source Water 
Pollution Control Policies, 20 J. AGRIC. & RES. ECON. 277, 279 (1995) (assuming convex 
water quality damage function). 
15 See discussion infra Part II. 
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and Drug Administration oversight of the administration of antibiotics 
to farm animals, and (5) the Packers and Stockyards Act. Each of 
these areas of law has its own focus, with its own regulatory sphere 
that somehow touches on the production of livestock. And 
agricultural interests in each of these areas have successfully lobbied 
to essentially be left alone, carrying out agricultural operations as they 
see fit, without regulatory or private interference. The resulting free-
for-all in a regulatory vacuum has created a hog industry that is highly 
concentrated, politically organized, and brutal in defending its 
economic position. 
This Article proposes a reform agenda centered upon the economic 
effects that each of these five areas of law have on the 
industrialization of hog production. Part I of this Article sets out a 
brief description and history of the hog industry, with attention 
towards productivity and externalities. Part II of this Article sets out 
the five different areas of law that have abetted concentration in the 
hog industry through legal policies which tend to overlook the harms 
caused by large hog farms. Part III of this Article presents some 
normative arguments for not only halting, but reversing, some of the 
concentration that has occurred in the hog industry over the past two 
decades. This Article then concludes with some general observations 
about hog farming, agriculture, and trends towards industry 
concentration. 
I 
THE HOG INDUSTRY 
The hog industry has never been glamorous, but it has long been an 
important component of the American livestock industry.16 In 2012, 
over twenty billion pounds of pork and pork products were 
produced17 from hogs raised on about sixty thousand hog farms in the 
 
16 See generally Per Capita Consumption of Poultry and Livestock, 1965 to Estimated 
2016, in Pounds, NAT’L CHICKEN COUNCIL, http://www nationalchickencouncil.org 
/about-the-industry/statistics/per-capita-consumption-of-poultry-and-livestock-1965-to      
-estimated-2012-in-pounds (comparing consumption rates of commonly eaten meats) (last 
updated July 10, 2015). 
17 Pork: Supply and Disappearance (Carcass Weight, Million Pounds) and Per Capita 
Disappearance (Pounds), U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RES. SERV., http://www.ers.usda 
.gov/datafiles/Livestock_Meat_Domestic_Data/Quarterly_red_meat_poultry_and_egg 
_supply_and_disappearance_and_per_capita_disappearance/Pork/WASDE_PorkFull.pdf 
(last updated Oct. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Pork Supply and Disappearance]. 
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United States.18 American pork production, taking into account the 
cyclical nature of agricultural commodities, has increased fairly 
steadily at an average rate of 1.25% per year from 1970.19 Inventory 
of live hogs in the United States has also ticked upward, from about 
fifty-three million in 196920 to just over sixty-six million in 2012—an 
average increase of about 0.5% per year.21 That production has 
increased more quickly than inventory, reflecting the industrial trend 
of producing larger hogs for slaughter.22 
These unspectacular trend figures, however, mask the stunning 
transformation of the hog industry from small-scale production to 
large-scale production. In 1969, only 7% of all hogs were on farms of 
a thousand or more hogs.23 In 2012, that figure had risen to almost 
96%.24 From 1969 to 2012, the number of hog farms in the United 
States fell by seven-eighths, while hog production steadily 
increased.25 Hog farming has become intensely concentrated: almost 
three thousand farms had five thousand or more hogs—a category that 
did not even exist in 1992.26 One hundred and thirty hog owners—
0.2% of all hog owners—collectively own 57% of all hogs.27 
Perhaps nothing symbolizes the industrialization and concentration 
of hog farming as much as the trend towards contract farming. Most 
individual hog farmers no longer own the hogs they handle. In 1992, 
only 3% of all inventoried hogs in the United States were being raised 
under a contractual arrangement; now that number is 71%.28 
Vertically integrated corporations—ones that assume the entire 
production and marketing undertaking—own the hogs29 and contract 
 
18 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE – STATE DATA 359–66 tbl.12 
(2014) [hereinafter USDA 2012 CENSUS], http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications 
/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_2_US_State_Level/st99_2_012_012.pdf. 
19 Pork Supply and Disappearance, supra note 17. Calculations derived from the data 
are on file with the author. 
20 USDA 2012 CENSUS, supra note 18, at 359–66 tbl.12. Calculations derived from the 
data are on file with the author. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 In 1969, there were over 532,000 hog farms in the United States; in 2012, there were 
about 63,000. Id. 
26 MCBRIDE & KEY, supra note 8, at 10. 
27 Id. at 4. 
28 Id. at 14. 
29 Betsy Freese, Pork Powerhouses 2010: Back in Black, AGRICULTURE.COM (Sept. 17, 
2010, 11:05 AM), http://www.agriculture.com/livestock/ pk-powerhouses-2010-back-in    
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with individual farmers30 to handle a particular phase of hog rearing 
under very specific parameters set out by the corporation.31 A typical 
production contract might provide that an integrated firm will deliver 
a certain number of hogs on a certain date,32 and that the firm will 
provide “general instructions with respect to the care and husbandry 
of [hogs].”33 It typically requires the contractor to agree to 
acknowledge receipt of, and to comply with the requirements of a hog 
“handbook.”34 The firm retains rights of inspection, and contractors 
agree to forbid access to the hogs unless approved by the firm.35 Feed 
and veterinary services are supplied to the contractor from the 
corporation exclusively.36 Contractors are prohibited from going 
outside of the corporation for anything affecting the welfare of the 
hogs.37 Unmistakably, large livestock conglomerates have taken 
charge of the production process. For their efforts, they have been 
able to achieve clear gains in efficiency.38 
Contract farming implies a vertically integrated production 
process. The point of contract farming from the perspective of the 
integrated firm is to eliminate the variability in production, pool risks, 
and to be able to optimize production from birth to slaughter to 
processing to marketing.39 A vertically integrated firm pools 
information in a way that would be extremely difficult for a network 
of hog farmers to do. For example, it is difficult for an individual hog 
farmer to find the best breeding boars and sows from among hundreds 
of thousands, translate anticipated future market conditions into 
 
-black_275-ar9803. Smithfield Foods, the largest hog conglomerate, owns about nine 
hundred thousand breeding sows, see id., and fifteen million hogs overall. Eliza Barclay, 
Smithfield Prods Its Pork Suppliers to Dump Pig Crates, NPR: THE SALT (Jan. 7, 2014, 
11:57 AM), http://www npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2014/01/07/260439063/smithfield-prods-its  
-pork-suppliers-to-dump-pig-crates. 
30 Barclay, supra note 29. Smithfield Foods has approximately twenty-one hundred 
contracts. Id. 
31 Nigel Key & William McBride, Production Contracts and Productivity in the U.S. 
Hog Sector, 85 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 121, 121 (2003). 
32 E.g., Contract, Christensen Farms & Feedlots, Inc. cl. 4.C (Mar. 14, 2001) (on file 
with author). 
33 Id. at cl. 3.C. 
34 Id. at cl. 4.K. 
35 Id. at cl. 5. 
36 Id. at cl. 3.C. 
37 Id. at cl. 6.A. 
38 Key & McBride, supra note 31, at 121. 
39 Id. at 122. 
        
32 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94, 23 
production decisions, and shuttle hogs among a network of farms to 
minimize transportation costs. Vertically integrated firms exercise 
tight control over feed administered to their hogs, which provides 
uniformity but also offers an opportunity to experiment with different 
feed mixtures (such as adding antibiotics for growth promotion 
purposes).40 By virtue of their size, vertically integrated firms are able 
to ferret out the best price for feed—the largest cost of hog farming.41 
Vertical integration ironically breaks up hog farming into different 
stages. Traditional “farrow-to-finish”42 hog farms birthed piglets on 
the farm and raised them to slaughter weight, feeding them corn and 
soybean that was grown on the farm itself. Hogs were traditionally 
sold at local markets, which were in turn connected to larger 
distribution networks.43 Meanwhile, the modern, vertically integrated 
farming operation may have one type of hog farm that breeds hogs, 
another that farrows piglets and weans them, and another that fattens 
them to slaughter weight.44 Then, the hogs are sent to an in-house 
slaughterhouse that is operated to accept hogs at just the right time so 
as to operate at near capacity.45 This separation of hog-raising phases 
has allowed livestock conglomerates to realize efficiencies by 
specialization. Individual hog farmers have, by specializing in a 
particular phase, become marginally more proficient at breeding, 
weaning, or finishing, and thus marginally more effective as hog 
farmers.46 Slaughterhouses, as well, have grown in size and 
specialization—segregating slaughter into different types of pork cuts 
and products—to further take advantage of economies of scale and 
 
40 See discussion infra Part II.D. 
41 MCBRIDE & KEY, supra note 8, at 15; Timothy A. Wise & Sarah E. Trist, Buyer 
Power in the U.S. Hog Markets: A Critical Review of the Literature (Glob. Dev. & Env’t 
Inst., Working Paper No. 10-04, 2010), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/10-04 
HogBuyerPower.pdf. 
42 Farrow-to-finish is typically a confinement operation where hogs are bred and raised 
to their slaughter weight, usually 225–300 pounds. Facilities with a capacity of 2500 or 
more swine are considered by the EPA to be CAFOs subject to point source pollution 
permit requirements. Other types of hog operations include farrow-to-feeder pig, feeder 
pig-to-finish, weanling-to-feeder pig, and farrow-to-weanling. WILLIAM D. MCBRIDE & 
NIGEL KEY, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., AGRIC. ECON. REPORT NO. 
818, ECONOMIC AND STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIPS IN U.S. HOG PRODUCTION 2 (2003), 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/488755/aer818_1_.pdf. 
43 MCBRIDE & KEY, supra note 8, at 5. 
44 JAMES M. MACDONALD, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., 
AGRIC. ECON. REPORT NO. 785, CONSOLIDATION IN U.S. MEATPACKING 6 (2000), 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/493235/aer785_1_.pdf. 
45 Id. 
46 MCBRIDE & KEY, supra note 8, at 1. 
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further reduce costs.47 Notoriously volatile spot markets, the 
traditional means of marketing finished hogs, now account for only 
8% of sales, down from 62% in 1994.48 Spot markets also happen to 
be how most small hog farms market their finished hogs.49 
The pursuit of economies of scale drives this supersizing and 
specialization of hog operations.50 The difference can be dramatic: 
among farrow-to-finish operations that raise hogs from birth to 
slaughter, a farm of less than five hundred hogs incurred operating 
expenses more than twice that of farms with five thousand or more 
hogs.51 That large of a gap effectively consigns anything less than a 
mega-farm, or very large CAFO, to supplying “niche” pork markets, 
where consumers are willing to pay a premium for hogs raised in 
more humane conditions or produce fewer environmental problems.52 
Outside of niche markets, profit margins in hog farming are 
tantalizingly small—but narrow advantages multiplied over large 
volumes of hogs translate into potentially decisive competitive 
advantages. For example, feeder-to-finish operations, which take 
weaned hogs and fatten them to slaughter weight, yield a relatively 
small cost advantage for operations with five thousand or more hogs 
over those with fewer than five hundred hogs: roughly a 20% cost 
savings. But that is enough to have driven most production on feeder-
to-finish farms onto larger farms.53 
The late Nobel Laureate economist Ronald Coase wrote in 1937 
that the nature of a firm was to reduce the transaction costs of doing 
business.54 Internalizing different aspects of production could save a 
 
47 MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 45, at 5–6. 
48 Glenn Grimes & Ron Plain, U.S. Hog Marketing Contract Study tbl.1 (Univ. of Mo. 
Dep’t of Agric. Econ., Working Paper AEWP 2009-1, 2009), http://agebb missouri.edu 
/mkt/vertstud09 htm. 
49 DOUG GURIAN-SHERMAN, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, CAFOS 
UNCOVERED: THE UNTOLD COSTS OF CONFINED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 22 
(2008), http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/food_and 
_agriculture/cafos-uncovered.pdf. 
50 MCBRIDE & KEY, supra note 42, at 1 (“Economies of size are a form of cost 
variation among farms based on the premise that larger farms have lower per unit costs 
than smaller farms. Therefore, farms will become larger over time as smaller farms exit 
the industry or expand to take advantage of lower costs.”). 
51 MCBRIDE & KEY, supra note 8, at 12. 
52 Peter J. Lammers et al., Foreword to NICHE PORK PRODUCTION (2007), http://www 
.ipic.iastate.edu/publications/IPICNPP.pdf. 
53 MCBRIDE & KEY, supra note 8, at 11 tbl.2 (showing that feeder-to-finish hog farms 
averaged 7222 hog sales or removals in 2009). 
54 See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
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firm costs by dispensing with partners that may or may not be reliable 
or forthright or that may harbor different assumptions about the 
transaction.55 Coase certainly did not have the hog industry in mind, 
but its evolution serves as an elegant example of transaction cost 
economics, the field that Coase’s works have spawned.56 The hog 
industry is an apt example of an industry trying to minimize 
transaction costs. While the hog industry has not become one gigantic 
firm, it has moved in that direction with its vertical integration model. 
The hog industry will never be able to completely insulate itself from 
commodity price fluctuations or weather-induced losses, but it can 
diversify its risk and control just about every aspect of hog production 
by integrating production under one central clearinghouse. Livestock 
conglomerates, possessing a menu of productivity-improving and 
risk-spreading techniques, have sought to bring far-flung operations 
in-house, or contractually secured cooperation in incorporating those 
techniques into hog production. The result is an industry that has 
drastically reduced the uncertainty involved with hog farming, and 
lowered a wide array of transaction costs associated with the 
production of a notoriously volatile commodity. 
At first glance, the newly efficient and highly concentrated hog 
industry would appear to have a smaller footprint than the traditional, 
small-scale, farrow-to-finish farm. The loss of almost half of a million 
hog farms has likely released hundreds of thousands of acres of land 
to other uses, some of them other farm uses.57 But the impacts of the 
new, supersized CAFOs extend well beyond property lines. 
Traditional farrow-to-finish hog farms were often part of larger, crop-
growing farms, which raised a relatively small number of hogs. Hogs 
were fed surplus crops that were grown on that same farm, and hog 
manure was disposed of by spreading it on the adjoining, on-site 
crops. At such small scales, manure can be applied to growing crops 
without producing an excess that would spill off into nearby 
waterways during heavy rains. But the modern large hog CAFO 
 
55 See id. 
56 See generally, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 
(1960); Douglass C. North & John J. Wallis, Integrating Institutional Change and 
Technical Change in Economic History a Transaction Cost Approach, 150 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 609 (1994); Stewart J. Schwab, Coase’s Twin 
Towers: The Relation Between The Nature of the Firm and The Problem of Social Cost, 18 
J. CORP. L. 359 (1993); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural 
Progression, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 673 (2010). 
57 See, e.g., Jacqueline Waymack, Agricultural Preservation Techniques in Virginia, 18 
COLONIAL LAW. 11, 11 (1989). 
        
2015] Scale Economies, Scale Externalities: Hog Farming 35 
and the Changing American Agricultural Industry 
generates far more manure than could be safely applied to on-site 
crops without polluting nearby waters.58 Special handling is required, 
often by paying other farmers to accept their excess manure for crop 
fertilization.59 Failing that, CAFOs may or may not fully comply with 
local, state, or federal laws regulating agricultural runoff. In terms of 
feed, the vertically integrated hog industry also relies on a 
sophisticated and calibrated system of feed supply that obtains feed 
off-site and transports it to individual contract hog farmers, generating 
a different mix for each stage of hog production.60 That system of 
industrial feed production, which requires energy-intensive fertilizer 
and generates a transportation footprint, produces a wider and more 
harmful array of environmental effects.61 
Large CAFOs are a creature not only of economics, but also legal 
policy. As they have emerged in the last four decades, they have not 
only transformed production and consumption of meat, but have also 
created a widening circle of environmental and social impacts. This 
Article catalogs those outsized environmental and social impacts, and 
shows how legal rules and institutions have largely given CAFOs a 
pass, allowing them to outcompete and displace smaller farms. 
II 
LEGAL POLICIES LEADING TO LARGER CAFOS 
A. State Right-to-Farm Laws 
In Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., the 
Supreme Court of Arizona predictably held that a property developer 
could successfully recover in nuisance against a nearby foul-smelling 
cattle feedlot.62 From a jurisprudential point of view, it was not even 
 
58 MCBRIDE & KEY, supra note 8, at 36. 
59 “Excess” means the amount of manure that can be applied on adjoining crops 
without causing nutrient overloading. MARC RIBAUDO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
ECON. RESEARCH SERV., AGRIC. ECON. REPORT NO. 824, MANURE MANAGEMENT FOR 
WATER QUALITY COSTS TO ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS OF APPLYING MANURE 
NUTRIENTS TO LAND 6 (2003), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=757884. 
60 See NIGEL KEY & WILLIAM MCBRIDE, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH 
SERV., THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF U.S. HOG PRODUCTION 9 (2007); Nigel Key, 
Production Contracts and Farm Business Growth and Survival, 45 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED 
ECON. 277, 278 (2013). 
61 It should be noted that the special feed is also more efficient in reducing hog waste. 
MCBRIDE & KEY, supra note 8, at 36. 
62 494 P.2d 700, 707–08 (Ariz. 1972). 
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surprising that the plaintiff developer won despite actively expanding 
his retirement community towards the cattle feedlot, which had been 
operating for years. The “coming to the nuisance” defense has long 
been declared, in most states, to be an incomplete defense to a 
nuisance claim.63 But the legislative backlash following Spur 
Industries took everyone by surprise. It was as if some inchoate 
discomfort with nuisance laws suddenly exploded into plain view, and 
the Spur Industries case became a fulcrum for political action to 
reverse, state-by-state, its holding. 
Between 1976 and 1991, every single state and Puerto Rico passed 
some form of a right-to-farm (RTF) law.64 To widely varying 
degrees, RTF laws provide farms with a defense to nuisance claims 
brought by plaintiffs that migrate toward—or “come to”—any 
allegedly nuisance-creating farm. RTF laws thus reverse a trend 
towards diminishing the importance of the coming to the nuisance 
defense.65 While most commonwealth jurisdictions have relegated the 
coming to the nuisance defense to being just one factor in a 
multifactor analysis, RTF laws resurrect it as an absolute defense. At 
least with respect to farms, nuisance lawsuits have become 
considerably more difficult to win.66 
RTF laws commonly set out some definition of the agricultural 
operations that can raise the defense, a list of permitted operational 
changes that can be undertaken without losing the defense, and some 
time limit that serves as an effective statute of limitations on any 
claims of nuisance against a farm. The stated purpose of RTF laws is 
to preserve agricultural lands and protect them against the 
encroaching sprawl of residential development.67 Why should a cattle 
 
63 See, e.g., Jacques v. Pioneer Plastics, Inc., 676 A.2d 504, 508 (Me. 1996); Mark v. 
Oregon ex rel. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 84 P.3d 155, 163 (Or. Ct. App. 2004). 
64 Neil D. Hamilton, Right-to-Farm Laws Reconsidered: Ten Reasons Why Legislative 
Efforts to Resolve Agricultural Nuisances May Be Ineffective, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 103, 
103–04 (1998). 
65 Id. at 104. 
66 See Jacqueline P. Hand, Right-to-Farm Laws: Breaking New Ground in the 
Preservation of Farmland, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 289, 305 (1984) (“In enacting the right-to-
farm laws, the various state legislatures have made the policy judgment that the social 
benefits of retaining land in agriculture are so critical that, rather than allowing courts to 
decide on a case-by-case basis whether an agricultural use is reasonable, the balance 
between agriculture and other uses should always be tipped toward agriculture.”). 
67 E.g., IND. CODE § 32-30-6-9(b) (2015) (“The general assembly declares that it is the 
policy of the state to conserve, protect, and encourage the development and improvement 
of its agricultural products. The general assembly finds that when nonagricultural land 
uses extend into agricultural areas, agricultural operations often become the subject of 
nuisance suits. As a result, agricultural operations are sometimes forced to cease 
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feedlot or hog farm that started out in the middle of nowhere have to 
continually worry about the approaching advance of property 
developers? It seemed not only grossly unfair, but counterproductive 
to make them dance around the whim and caprice of developers. 
But RTF laws do not protect all agricultural lands. In Parker v. 
Obert’s Legacy Dairy, an Indiana court heard a nuisance claim 
brought by one neighbor, an owner of a hobby farm, against another 
neighbor, a dairy farm that grew from 100 to 760 dairy cows in a 
single year.68 The difference between the two farms is that 
defendant’s farm was large enough to be a nuisance due to the amount 
of manure, and thus odor, it caused; plaintiff’s was not.69 As 
demonstrated in Obert’s Legacy Dairy, most serious nuisance 
lawsuits are filed against large and very large CAFOs,70 and most 
commonly complaining of the odors they generate.71 The odors from 
hog CAFOs are particularly strong—studies have decomposed hog 
 
operations, and many persons may be discouraged from making investments in farm 
improvements. It is the purpose of this section to reduce the loss to the state of its 
agricultural resources by limiting the circumstances under which agricultural operations 
may be deemed to be a nuisance.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-700 (2015) (with nearly 
identical language). 
68 988 N.E.2d 319, 320–21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The court granted summary judgment 
for the larger dairy farm, finding that Indiana’s right-to-farm law “insulate[d] the Obert’s 
expansion of their dairy farm from nuisance suits under these circumstances.” Id. at 325. 
For further discussion about the impact of the Obert’s Legacy Dairy case, see infra notes 
80–82 and accompanying text. 
69 Id. at 320. 
70 See, e.g., Initial Case Management Order, In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 
5:15-CV-13-BR (E.D.N.C. Jan. 9, 2015). Murphy-Brown LLC, the defendant in this mass 
litigation, is a hog producer for Smithfield Foods. Welcome to Smithfield’s Hog 
Production Division, MURPHY BROWN LLC, http://www murphybrownllc.com/ (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2015). 
71 E.g., Shatto v. McNulty, 509 N.E.2d 897, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (“We must 
observe that pork production generates odors which cannot be prevented, and so long as 
the human race consumes pork, someone must tolerate the smell.”); Weinhold v. Wolff, 
555 N.W.2d 454, 459 (Iowa 1996) (odor preventing neighbors from sleeping); Flansburgh 
v. Coffey, 370 N.W.2d 127, 130 (Neb. 1985) (odor causing watering eyes and breathing 
problems); JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE 
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 13:3 (3d ed. 2013); Harrison M. 
Pittman, Validity, Construction, and Application of Right-to-Farm Acts, 8 A.L.R. 6th 465 
(2005); J. Patrick Wheeler, Livestock Odor & Nuisance Actions vs. “Right-to-Farm” 
Laws: Report by Defendant Farmer’s Attorney, 68 N.D. L. REV. 459, 460–63 (1992) 
(summarizing a wide variety of cases of nuisance lawsuits involving odors from hog 
farms); Tomislav Vukina et al., Swine Odor Nuisance: Voluntary Negotiation, Litigation, 
and Regulation: North Carolina’s Experience, 11 CHOICES, First Quarter 1996, at 26 
(“The strongest public opposition has focused on offensive odors released from hog barns 
and manure-collecting lagoons of these large hog operations.”). 
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manure odors into over three hundred discrete compounds; a handful 
of them are harmful to human health, and some score very high on 
subjective assessments of odor strength.72 Even in milder cases where 
odors may not cause health problems, they can still inhibit outdoor 
activity.73 RTF laws wield their greatest significance when they 
protect these large-scale farms from nuisance suits, but they do not 
play a significant role in protecting the vast majority of the smaller-
scale farms,74 which emit noxious odors in much smaller doses. 
Should large or very large CAFOs enjoy an absolute coming to the 
nuisance defense? Lockean concepts of property ownership, vesting 
property rights in those that have mixed their labor with the land,75 
lend an appeal to the defense of farmers in particular. And a first-in-
time, first-in-right rule76 offers simplicity and predictability. But a 
coming to the nuisance defense is a form of grandfathering, a 
differentiation of right on the basis of priority. Allocating a property 
priority to first settlers is to choose a particular point in time—the 
establishment of a CAFO—as the time for a baseline condition. But 
that is an arbitrary choice. There is no reason to allow noxious land 
uses to continue just because they were there first. The first land use, 
which in some cases began hundreds of years ago, says little about the 
best current land use. 
 
72 Susan S. Schiffman et al., Quantification of Odors and Odorants from Swine 
Operations in North Carolina, 108 AGRIC. & FOREST METEOROLOGY 213, 236–38 
(2001). 
73 Flansburgh, 370 N.W.2d at 130 (“They can no longer have backyard cookouts, and 
their grandchildren cannot play outside.”); see also K.M. Thu, Public Health Concerns for 
Neighbors of Large-Scale Swine Production Operations, 8 J. AGRIC. SAFETY & HEALTH 
175, 178 (2002). 
74 See generally, e.g., MIGUEL A. ALTIERI, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, ENV’T & DEV. 
SERIES 7, SMALL FARMS AS A PLANETARY ECOLOGICAL ASSET: FIVE KEY REASONS 
WHY WE SHOULD SUPPORT THE REVITALIZATION OF SMALL FARMS IN THE GLOBAL 
SOUTH 7 (2008), http://twn my/title/end/pdf/end07.pdf; Gerard D’Souza & John Ikerd, 
Small Farms and Sustainable Development: Is Small More Sustainable?, 28 J. AGRIC. & 
APPLIED ECON. 73, 73–78 (1996). 
75 Leigh Raymond & Sally K. Fairfax, The “Shift to Privatization” in Land 
Conservation: A Cautionary Essay, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 599, 606 (2002) (“Property 
arises, in Locke’s familiar allegory, through labor: someone removes something from the 
state of nature, making it her property, by mixing her sweat with it.”); see also Anne C. 
Dowling, Note, “Un-Locke-ing” a “Just Right” Environmental Regime: Overcoming the 
Three Bears of International Environmentalism – Sovereignty, Locke, and Compensation, 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 891, 912–18 (2002) (providing background on 
Lockean property rights theories). 
76 See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 11–13 (6th ed. 2006) 
(explaining the history and application of the first in time principle). 
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This line of argument has particular relevance in critically 
considering RTF laws. The prevailing evidence suggests that CAFOs 
cause significant devaluation of neighboring residential properties.77 
Not only does the ubiquitous odor of hog CAFOs cause houses for 
sale to show poorly every single day of the year, but air pollutants 
pose significant health risks for neighboring residents.78 And, if 
CAFOs and residential property are mutually exclusive land uses, 
there is no reason to begin with the presumption that CAFOs are the 
more valuable use. 
Finally, it is worth noting that some RTF laws do not stop at 
protecting existing CAFOs. Parker v. Obert’s Legacy Dairy upheld a 
fairly long-standing interpretation of Indiana’s RTF law as protecting 
not only existing farms, but also farms that expand operations.79 As 
long as a farm’s operational changes are not “fundamental” or 
“significant,” RTF laws preserve its grandfathered status.80 The 
defendant Obert’s Legacy Dairy expanded from about a hundred 
cows to over seven hundred81 (not a large CAFO by today’s standards 
but a dramatic upsizing). The court held that such an increase was not 
a “significant change” in the type of agricultural operation, and could 
therefore not be the subject of a nuisance lawsuit brought by 
neighbors.82 Apparently, the Indiana RTF law not only grandfathers 
in every farm, but grants it license to expand without limit, so long as 
 
77 Joseph A. Herriges et al., Living With Hogs in Iowa: The Impact of Livestock 
Facilities on Rural Residential Property Values, 81 LAND ECON. 530 (2005); Jungik Kim 
et al., Economic Impact and Public Costs of Confined Animal Feeding Operations at the 
Parcel Level of Craven County, North Carolina, 27 AGRIC. HUM. VALUES 29, 39–41 
(2010); Katherine Milla et al., Evaluating the Effect of Proximity to Hog Farms on 
Residential Property Values: A GIS-Based Hedonic Price Model Approach, 17 URB. & 
REGIONAL INFO. SYS. ASS’N J. 27, 30–31 (2005); Raymond B. Palmquist et al., Hog 
Operations, Environmental Effects, and Residential Property Values, 73 LAND ECON. 114 
tbl.3 (1997); Isaac Bayoh et al., The Value of Clean Dairy Air: Accounting for 
Endogeneity and Spatially Correlated Errors in a Hedonic Analyses of the Impact of 
Animal Operations on Local Property Values 18–20 (Am. Agric. Econ. Ass’n Annual 
Meeting, Denver Colo., Selected Paper, 2004), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream 
/20364 /1/sp04ba04.pdf. 
78 See infra Part II.C. 
79 988 N.E.2d 319, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 
80 E.g., Dalzell v. Country View Family Farms, 517 F. App’x 518, 519 (7th Cir. 2013); 
Obert’s Legacy Dairy, 988 N.E.2d at 324–25; Lindsey v. DeGroot, 898 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009); Laux v. Chopin Land Assocs., Inc., 550 N.E.2d 100, 103 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1990); Shatto v. McNulty, 509 N.E.2d 897, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). 
81 Obert’s Legacy Dairy, 988 N.E.2d at 321. 
82 Id. at 324. 
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it does not dramatically change the “type” of operations.83 Though, if 
expanding from one hundred to over seven hundred animals is not a 
significant change, then one is hard-pressed to imagine what is. 
RTF laws do not actually protect farms. Despite the label, RTF 
laws are an implicit subsidy for large CAFOs and, as such, are an 
assault on small farms. In creating a legal right to farm, state 
legislatures have unwittingly helped create economic conditions that 
have made it impossible for small farmers to exercise that right. 
B. Failure to Regulate CAFOs Under the Clean Water Act 
Traditional, small-scale hog production applies the hog manure to 
adjacent crops, saving on the need for synthetic, commercial 
fertilizers.84 Large CAFOs, on the other hand, produce more manure 
than can be applied to adjacent crops, so manure is stored in tanks or 
lagoons for future application on nearby land—or so it is hoped.85 
Poor manure handling and storage practices generate excess runoff 
and pollute surface waters.86 Unless manure is treated or moved off-
site, available cropland and pasture can only accept a fraction of the 
amount of manure that is produced before excess nitrogen and 
phosphorus “loading” occurs, which degrades water quality.87 The 
seepage and runoff from manure lagoons cause water bodies to 
experience algal blooms. In turn, algal blooms can create a variety of 
other ecological problems, including further oxygen depletion, 
prevention of photosynthesis through blocked sunlight, and the 
emission of toxins such as Pfisteria and fecal pathogens, such as 
Giardia and Cryptosporidium.88 These toxins and fecal pathogens can 
either kill fish and wildlife, or render them unfit for consumption.89 
Nitrogen is also released indirectly into water bodies by the air 
 
83 Id. 
84 JOHN A. LORY & RAY MASSEY, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, USING MANURE AS A 
FERTILIZER FOR CROP PRODUCTION 3–4 (2006), http://water.epa.gov/type/watersheds 
/named/msbasin/upload/2006_8_25_msbasin_symposia_ia_session8.pdf; RIBAUDO ET AL., 
supra note 59, at 16–20. 
85 RIBAUDO ET AL., supra note 59, at 5–6. 
86 Id. at 5–8. 
87 CARRIE HRIBAR, NAT’L ASS’N OF LOCAL BDS. OF HEALTH, UNDERSTANDING 
CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES 
4–5 (Mark Schultz ed., 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/docs/understanding_cafos 
_nalboh.pdf. 
88 Id. 
89 Id.; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLEAN COASTAL WATERS: 
UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING THE EFFECTS OF NUTRIENT POLLUTION 14–16 (2000); 
RIBAUDO ET AL, supra note 59, at 5–8. 
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emissions of ammonia, which is redeposited onto land and water.90 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated in 2003 
that 5% of all CAFOs produced 50% of regularly farmed animals 
(cows, hogs, and chickens)91 and 65% of excess nutrient runoff.92 
Large CAFOs commonly store manure in pits directly beneath the 
slatted floors of a hog barn, where they will remain until it is pumped 
out to be spread onto crops at the right time.93 However, the manure 
may remain in the storage pit for as long as one year, during which 
time it is emitting odors, harmful air pollutants, and the powerful 
greenhouse gas methane.94 More commonly, and even more 
environmentally offensive, is the practice of simply storing hog 
manure in an open-air surface lagoon, where it runs off into 
waterways during rains.95 Heavy rain events create large spills of hog 
manure into waterways, killing thousands of fish and shellfish at a 
time, and possibly necessitating the closure of local fisheries for 
weeks or months.96 There is also the strong suggestion that the 
application of hog manure on crops has polluted groundwater 
supplies.97 
 
90 John T. Walker et al., Atmospheric Transport and Wet Deposition of Ammonium in 
North Carolina, 34 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T. 3407, 3407–08 (2000). 
91 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent 
Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 
Fed. Reg. 2960, 2986 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 412). 
92 RIBAUDO ET AL., supra note 59, at 63. 
93 Anaerobic Digestion on Swine Operations, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www 
.epa.gov/agstar/anaerobic/swine html (last updated Dec. 18, 2014). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Michael A. Mallin et al., Comparative Effects of Poultry and Swine Waste Lagoon 
Spills on the Quality of Receiving Streamwaters, 26 J. ENVTL. QUALITY 1622, 1622 
(1997); Michael A. Mallin, Impacts of Industrial Animal Production on Rivers and 
Estuaries, 88 AM. SCIENTIST 26, 26 (2000). 
97 MARK F. BECKER ET AL., OKLA. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOOD, & FORESTRY, WATER-
RES. INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 02-4257, POSSIBLE SOURCES OF NITRATE IN GROUND 
WATER AT SWINE LICENSED-MANAGED FEEDING OPERATIONS IN OKLAHOMA, 2001 17–
22 (2002), http://pubs.usgs.gov/wri/wri024257/; Angela L. Batt et al., Occurrence of 
Sulfonamide Antimicrobials in Private Water Wells in Washington County, Idaho, USA, 64 
CHEMOSPHERE 1963, 1963 (2006), http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi 
?article=1017&context=watercenterpubs; R.L. Huffman & P.W. Westerman, Estimated 
Seepage Losses from Established Swine Waste Lagoons in the Lower Coastal Plain of 
North Carolina, 38 TRANSACTIONS AM. SOC’Y AGRIC. ENGINEERS 449, 449 (1995); C. 
Volland et al., Cost of Remediation of Nitrogen-Contaminated Soils Under CAFO 
Impoundments, 4 J. HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE RES. 3-1, 3-2 (2003). 
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Under hog contract arrangements, it is usually the contract 
growers—and not the conglomerates—that are responsible for 
manure management and disposing of it properly.98 Conglomerates 
have used their market power over contract growers to devolve 
themselves of the major pollution control expense.99 Individual 
contract growers often do not have sufficient margins to adequately 
treat pollution.100 Contract growers, lacking deep pockets, are also 
more sympathetic regulatory targets,101 and are thus used by the 
conglomerates as de facto human shields in the regulatory war they 
wage with environmental regulators. 
For all the trouble it causes, the cost of controlling water pollution 
created by hog manure is not very high. The cost of large CAFOs to 
comply with EPA standards for manure lagoons and sprayfield 
systems, which collect hog manure and spray it onto a field using a 
sprinkler system, is about $3.72 per finished hog,102 which translates 
into 1.6¢ per pound of pork produced from a two hundred and fifty 
pound hog. Additional techniques, such as construction of a wetland 
with specialized plants and soil to act as a filter, cost virtually 
nothing.103 But in an industry with tight margins, even small costs are 
at least perceived to be an existential threat to business. 
The mass production of hog manure also introduces an opportunity 
to profit, an opportunity which has been largely spurned by hog 
farmers. “Anaerobic digesters” sequester hog manure—not only 
capturing odors and air pollutants, but producing methane, which can 
be used to generate electricity.104 This creates a dual benefit: 
 
98 PEW, supra note 6, at 6; Christensen Farms & Feedlots, Inc., supra note 32, at cl. 
4.G. 
99 KATHRYN COCHRAN ET AL., ENVTL. DEF., DOLLARS AND SENSE: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE HOG WASTE MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGIES 15–18 (2000). 
100 PEW, supra note 6, at 6; Susan M. Brehm, Comment, From Red Barn to Facility: 
Changing Environmental Liability to Fit the Changing Structure of Livestock Production, 
93 CAL. L. REV. 797, 799 (2005). 
101 Philippe Bontems et al., Environmental Regulation of Livestock Production 
Contracts, in FRONTIERS IN THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND 
LIABILITY 265, 265 (Marcel Boyer et al. eds., 2006). 
102 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 99, at 19; see also N.C. State Univ., Dep’t of Agric. & 
Res. Econ., Technology Report: Anaerobic Lagoon and Sprayfield: Cost and Returns 
Analysis of Manure Management Systems Evaluated in 2004 Under the North Carolina 
Attorney General Agreements with Smithfield Foods, Premium Standard Farms, and Front 
Line Farmers 3–4 (July 2005) (unpublished report), http://www.cals ncsu.edu/waste_mgt 
/smithfield_projects/phase2report05/cd,web%20files/B1b.pdf. 
103 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 99, at 19–20. 
104 ANDREW E. DESSLER, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN CLIMATE CHANGE 77–79 
(2012) (Methane is a greenhouse gas that contributes to global warming, that is 
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sequestering a powerful greenhouse gas and creating an energy 
source. Anaerobic digesters105 pump hog manure into a zero-oxygen 
container (hence the term anaerobic), in which bacterial 
decomposition converts the manure and emitted gases into a solid 
organic waste and a gaseous mixture that includes methane.106 The 
resulting solid waste is a fertilizer, but is much less volatile and thus 
less polluting than the unprocessed hog manure, and the resulting gas 
can be combusted to generate electricity.107 Eliminated during the 
process are the byproducts of the odor that have spawned so many 
nuisance lawsuits,108 the air pollutants that are harmful to human 
health,109 the nutrients that pollute waterways,110 and the emission of 
a greenhouse gas. Instead, there is a benefit from the process: a source 
of energy. 
It is hard to overstate how colossal of a market failure it is for 
CAFOs to create as much pollution as they do. Ten million hogs in 
the North Carolina coastal plain generate more excrement than the 
populations of New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago 
combined.111 Hundreds of millions of dollars are spent in wastewater 
treatment in these three cities,112 yet the same cannot be said about 
 
approximately twenty times as powerful as carbon dioxide in trapping heat.); PETER 
CIBOROWSKI, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, ANAEROBIC DIGESTION OF 
LIVESTOCK MANURE FOR POLLUTION CONTROL AND ENERGY PRODUCTION: A 
FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT 14 (2001), http://www.pca.state mn.us/index.php/view              
-document.html?gid=9244; COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 99, at 20; S.M. Tauseef et al., 
Methane Capture from Livestock Manure, 117 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 187, 187 (2013) 
(“Manure-based methane has been estimated to contribute 4% of all anthropogenic 
methane that is presently being added up to other natural and anthropogenic sources of 
global warming.”). 
105 CIBOROWSKI, supra note 104, at 14. 
106 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 99, at 22. 
107 CIBOROWSKI, supra note 104, at 18. 
108 Wheeler, supra note 71. 
109 See infra Part II.C. 
110 See, e.g., Catherine M.H. Keske, Anaerobic Digestion Technology: How 
Agricultural Producers and the Environment Might Profit from Nuisance Lawsuits, 52 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 315, 317 (2012). 
111 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 99, at 7. 
112 See GRACE ROBINSON CHAN, SANITATION DISTRICTS OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY 
CALIFORNIA, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT sched. 12 (2013), 
http://www.lacsd.org/civica/filebank/blobdload .asp?BlobID=9018; CITY OF CHI., 
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE METROPOLITAN WATER 
RECLAMATION DISTRICT OF GREATER CHICAGO 19 (2013), https://www mwrd.org/pv 
_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_DBDBB10BBAEC275AC88E7A8C524031FAC0F02000/filename
/CAFR2013.pdf; CITY OF N.Y.C., NEW YORK CITY WATER & SEWER SYSTEM 2014: A 
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEARS ENDED JUNE 30, 
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CAFOs. In the long run, modest pollution control costs spent by 
CAFOs could generate enormous savings in avoided water treatment 
and provide countless environmental and ecological benefits. To say 
this is low-hanging fruit is a gross understatement. 
And yet regulation of the water pollution emanating from CAFOs 
was a long-delayed and still contested process. The EPA is charged 
with limiting discharges of pollution into “waters of the United 
States” under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES)113 in the Clean Water Act.114 The EPA’s mandate under the 
NPDES program was clear enough with respect to CAFOs. The 
original passage of the Clean Water Act in 1972115 included the 
specific words “concentrated animal feeding operations” in the 
definition of “point source”116 to indicate that Congress intended for 
the EPA to regulate CAFOs as it regulates industrial sources of 
pollution: by issuing appropriate “effluent limitations.” In 2001, nine 
years after a consent decree required the EPA to develop NPDES 
permitting regulations for CAFOs,117 the EPA proposed a rule that 
would require, for the first time, CAFOs to obtain an NPDES 
permit.118 Two more years of controversy produced a final rule in 
2003.119 However, this rule was challenged by environmental 
organizations on the grounds that it did not require that actual nutrient 
management plans be part of NPDES permit applications. Since the 
term “effluent limitation” is defined as a limit on “quantities, rates, 
and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other 
constituents” discharged,120 an NPDES permit without even a 
statement of how CAFOs intended to limit the amount of nutrients 
escaping into waterways—never mind an actual limit on quantities, 
rates, or concentrations—was not an “effluent limitation” at all. 
 
2014 AND 2013 3 (2014), http://www nyc.gov/html/nycwaterboard/pdf/statements_and 
_reports/wb_annual_report_14.pdf. 
113 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012). 
114 Id. at §§ 1251–1387. 
115 Pub. L. No. 92-500 § 502(14), 86 Stat. 816, 887 (1972). 
116 Id. 
117 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent 
Limitation Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations 
(CAFOs), 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7186 (Feb. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 
123, 412). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Waterkeeper All., Inc., v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 399 F.3d 486, 502 (2d Cir. 
2005) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11)). 
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It is certainly true that regulating the water pollution resulting from 
the inappropriate handling of hog manure is a much less exact science 
than even the inexact sciences of regulating industrial discharges from 
an outflow pipe. By its nature, farm pollution is more diffuse, and its 
inputs—livestock manure, pesticides, eroding soil—are less 
susceptible of quantification. Farm pollution is thus less susceptible to 
quantity, rate, or concentration regulation. Therefore, it is 
understandable that the EPA might want to tackle other regulatory 
challenges first. But the protracted and litigation-driven nature of the 
process suggests that the EPA never, as a political matter, wished to 
impose any burdens on farmers. For the EPA to make its first 
proposed rule in 2001, almost thirty years after Congress instructed 
the EPA to regulate CAFO discharges, is a bit ridiculous. It could 
well have been longer if it were not for a lawsuit by an environmental 
organization.121 Not only that, but the 2001 rule was so weak that 
another lawsuit filed by another environmental organization122 finally 
forced the EPA, after another six years, to finally develop a final 
rule:123 a total of thirty-six years after Congress gave the EPA its 
explicit marching orders.124 
Why has the EPA been so reluctant to regulate CAFOs when 
Congress spoke so clearly? This Article is not a descriptive account of 
the politics of agricultural law or policy. That is well-trod ground 
better left to political scientists and political economists.125 Rather, 
 
121 Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Reilly, 983 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
122 Waterkeeper All., Inc., 399 F.3d at 502. 
123 Revised National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and 
Effluent Limitations Guidelines for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations in Response 
to the Waterkeeper Decision, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,418, 70,418 (Nov. 20, 2008) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 412). 
124 In 2008, the EPA’s final rule was challenged by the National Pork Producers 
Council, Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 635 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 
2011), and resulted in another change to the 2008 rule. The rule exempted CAFOs that 
were only proposing to discharge water pollutants. National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation (CAFO) Reporting 
Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 65,431, 65,435 (Oct. 21, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122). 
125 See, e.g., David Freshwater, An Interview with Lee Hamilton, 9 CHOICES, Fourth 
Quarter 1994, at 34 (“[E]ven though farmers are a very small percentage of the population, 
and one that is getting smaller every year, they retain political clout that far exceeds their 
numbers.”); Robert Paarlberg, The Political Economy of American Agricultural Policy: 
Three Approaches, 71 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1157, 1157 (1989) (“U.S. policy is said to 
protect agriculture because of something distinctive in our nation’s ideology, a 
Jeffersonian belief in the unique virtue of small yeomen farmers.”); Rausser, supra note 2, 
at 134 (discussing inefficient “predatory” government policy as opposed to efficient 
“productive” agricultural practices). 
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this Article is a description of the extent to which law and policy have 
been bent to the will of certain agricultural interests. It has not been 
the will of the majority of farmers, the vast majority of which have 
small farms. It has been the will of large farmers who would actually 
have to suffer the costs of compliance. A USDA study found that only 
46% of small farms (defined as less than 300 animal units, or 750 
hogs weighing more than fifty-five pounds)126 would comply with the 
EPA’s 2003 proposed regulations for nitrogen discharges.127 
However, only 18% of large farms (defined as more than 2500 hogs 
of at least fifty-five pounds)128 would meet the same standard.129 
Similarly skewed numbers existed for the EPA phosphorous standard: 
69% of small farms versus 20% of large farms.130 The net costs of 
properly disposing of hog manure—paying crop farmers to accept it 
as fertilizer—depends on how much excess manure is generated and 
also whether there are nearby crop farmers that can use it without 
creating nutrient overloading problems of their own. Large farms will 
generally pay significantly higher costs for disposal on a per-unit 
basis, if one subtracts out the one-time plan development costs that 
are required.131 Given these cost dynamics, it seems clear that large 
farms have had the most to lose from the EPA regulation of water 
pollution from hog farming. 
C. Failure to Regulate Air Emissions from CAFOs 
Pollution from hog manure is not limited to runoff. Much less 
appreciated, but still quite costly, are the air emissions from hog 
manure. Volatilized ammonia, the gaseous form of nitrogen 
emanating from hog excrement, pollutes in two ways: (1) by 
deposition onto land or water, reaching land and waterbodies beyond 
a spill range, and (2) while airborne, acting as a source of air 
pollution. 
 
126 RIBAUDO, ET AL., supra note 59, at 14. 
127 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent 
Limitation Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations 
(CAFOs), 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7186 (Feb. 12, 2003). 
128 RIBAUDO ET AL., supra note 59, at 14. 
129 Id. at 17 tbl.3-1. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 18–25. Plan development costs are high for small farms that do not already 
have them (and who would fail to meet the standard). The net disposal costs are actually 
higher for small farms than large farms. Id. at 20. 
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Ammonia emitted from hog manure and deposited onto land or 
water will assume the form of ammonia ions, which acidify soils and 
receiving waterbodies.132 An estimated 430,000 tons of ammonia 
were emitted in 2002,133 enough to make over thirty-seven billion 32-
ounce bottles of Windex.134 Deposit after emission tends to occur 
relatively locally, within thirty miles of the emitting CAFO.135 In 
addition to presenting ecological threats through land or water 
deposition, ammonia also presents a public health threat. Airborne 
ammonia is a fine particulate matter, which causes respiratory 
problems ranging from irritation and asthma to premature death,136 
and ammonia is estimated to be about half of all fine particulate 
matter emitted in the eastern United States.137 
CAFOs also emit hydrogen sulfide,138 which causes health effects 
ranging from temporary to long-term moodiness and depression139 
and, in more serious cases, severe debilitation and even the occasional 
death.140 The most prevalent health effects of emissions are non-
 
132 Sagar V. Krupa, Effects of Atmospheric Ammonia (NH3) on Terrestrial Vegetation: 
A Review, 124 ENVTL. POLLUTION 179, 205 (2003). 
133 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL EMISSION INVENTORY–AMMONIA 
EMISSIONS FROM ANIMAL HUSBANDRY 4 (2004), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/ap42/ch09 
/related/nh3inventoryfactsheet_jan2004.pdf. 
134 MATERIAL SAFETY AND DATA SHEET: WINDEX POWERIZED GLASS CLEANER 
(RTU), DIVERSEY (2012), http://www foothill.edu/printmaking/msds/windex_msds.pdf 
(indicates that it is 0.1% to 1.5% ammonia by weight); AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com 
(search “Windex 32oz”) (shipping weight of a 32-ounce glass is 2.3 pounds) (search 
conducted March 3, 2015, printout on file with author). 
135 GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 49, at 54. 
136 Donald R. McCubbin et al., Livestock Ammonia Management and Particulate-
Related Health Benefits, 36 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1141, 1141 (2002); Particulate Matter 
(PM), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/pm/ (last updated Sept. 10, 2015). 
Fine particulate matter is defined as airborne solids less than 2.5 microns in diameter. Id. 
137 Natalie Anderson et al., Airborne Reduced Nitrogen: Ammonia Emissions from 
Agriculture and Other Sources, 29 ENVMT. INT’L 277, 277 (2003). 
138 GURIAN-SHERMAN, supra note 49, at 55. 
139 Kaye H. Kilburn, Exposure to Reduced Sulfur Gases Impairs Neurobehavioral 
Function, 90 S. MED. J. 997, 997 (1997); Susan S. Schiffman et al., Symptomatic Effects of 
Exposure to Diluted Air Sampled from a Swine Confinement Atmosphere on Healthy 
Human Subjects, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 567, 567 (2005). 
140 Kelley J. Donham et al., Acute Toxic Exposure to Gases from Liquid Manure, 24 J. 
OCCUPATIONAL MED. 142, 144 (1982); Kelley Donham et al., Environmental and Health 
Studies of Farm Workers in Swedish Swine Confinement Buildings, 46 BRITISH J. INDUS. 
MED. 31, 32 (1989); Kelley J. Donham, Health Effects from Work in Swine Confinement 
Buildings, 17 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 17, 18 (1990); Kelley J. Donham et al., Production 
Rates of Toxic Gases from Liquid Swine Manure: Health Implications for Workers and 
Animals in Swine Confinement Buildings, 24 BIOLOGICAL WASTES 161, 163 (1988); Lida 
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lethal, but still costly. A number of studies have shown that CAFO 
emissions lead to significant increases in cases of asthma and nasal 
allergies.141 Effects are more acute among adolescents attending 
school near large hog CAFOs, who suffer a higher incidence of 
asthma,142 and more acute still for children living on hog farms.143 
Like water pollution regulation under the Clean Water Act, air 
pollution regulation under the Clean Air Act would be challenging 
from an administrative perspective. Unlike the Clean Water Act, the 
Clean Air Act contains no explicit inclusion of CAFOs into a 
regulatory definition like “point source,”144 so the EPA could more 
defensibly avoid the task. The EPA rule for water pollution from 
CAFOs is a general permit, which applies broadly to a class of 
dischargers, thereby avoiding the need to issue each of the sixty 
thousand hog farms individually.145 No such mechanism exists under 
the Clean Air Act. Regulating each CAFO as a “source” of pollution, 
much like one would regulate a fossil-fueled power plant or a 
refinery, would be an enormous headache for the EPA. 
Indisputably, however, emissions pose public health threats. Just as 
the EPA can target its water pollution regulatory efforts towards the 
largest hog CAFOs, it can target its air emissions regulation in large 
part toward the same hog CAFOs. After all, the source of the water 
pollution and air pollution is the same: the manure. 
 
N. Osbern & Robert O. Crapo, Dung Lung: A Report of Toxic Exposure to Liquid Manure, 
95 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 312, 314 (1981). 
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142 Maria C. Mirabelli et al., Asthma Symptoms Among Adolescents Who Attend Public 
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Students, 129 CHEST J. 1486, 1488 (2006). 
143 James A. Merchant et al., Asthma and Farm Exposures in a Cohort of Rural Iowa 
Children, 113 EVNTL. HEALTH PERSP. 350, 350 (2005). 
144 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012). 
145 See generally Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under 
the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409 (2007) (discussing the three classes of 
EPA permits in the NPDES program). 
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D. Lack of Oversight of Administration of Antibiotics to Livestock 
For decades, scientists have tracked the emergence of bacteria that 
are resistant to antibiotics used to treat them. Between 1940 and 1996, 
eight major strains were discovered.146 That number has doubled 
since then.147 Every time a person or animal is administered an 
antibiotic—needed or not—bacteria have an opportunity to develop a 
resistance to that antibiotic. Those bacteria are then transmitted. One 
method of transmission is through the stomach of livestock 
administered antibiotics, which is excreted in manure, and then 
propagated to wherever the manure is permitted to go. The same is 
true of humans.148 With every propagation there is an opportunity for 
bacteria to evolve and adapt, multiplying strains that resist the effects 
of antibiotics. The overuse of antibiotics in both humans and livestock 
has led to an alarming uptick in new antibiotic-resistant bacteria. The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimate that 
every year, over two million Americans contract a bacterial infection 
that is resistant to one or more common antibiotics that have been 
previously used to treat the infection.149 Of those, about twenty-three 
thousand die.150 
The most damaging strain of antibiotic-resistant bacteria is 
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, or MRSA, which 
accounts for eleven thousand deaths per year.151 MRSA infections 
seem to have a special link with the use of antibiotics in livestock, as 
new strains of MRSA have emerged that are uniquely endemic to 
hogs and hog farmers.152 The link to livestock use is particularly 
 
146 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013 28 (2013) [hereinafter CDC REPORT], http://www.cdc.gov 
/drugresistance/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 14. 
149 Id. at 11. 
150 Id.; see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE EVOLVING THREAT OF ANTIMICROBIAL 
RESISTANCE: OPTIONS FOR ACTION 28 (2012) (estimating sixty-three thousand out-patient 
deaths in the United States and twenty-five thousand in-patient deaths in Europe per year). 
151 CDC REPORT, supra note 146, at 16. 
152 T. Khanna et al., Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus Colonization in Pigs 
and Pig Farmers, 128 VETERINARY MICROBIOLOGY 298, 299–300 (2008); Inge van Loo 
et al., Emergence of Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus of Animal Origin in 
Humans, 13 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1834, 1834 (2007). 
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strong, as some of these new strains of MRSA have emerged solely 
from farm animals.153 
About 80% by volume of the antibiotics administered in the United 
States are given to livestock.154 Some CAFOs use antibiotics solely to 
promote animal growth, giving animals an added boost in fighting 
infection and freeing up bodily resources to add weight.155 It is 
especially harmful when CAFOs mix antibiotics in with feed,156 as if 
it were a vitamin supplement. The problem with this kind of 
subtherapeutic administration is that these low-level doses are high 
enough to affect bacteria, but not high enough to kill them all off—
giving bacteria the maximum chance to adapt, become antibiotic-
resistant, and multiply.157 
Exactly how common this practice is and who uses them is hard to 
say, as until recently neither farmers nor pharmaceutical companies 
were required to report on their use or sale of antibiotics.158 In the 
most authoritative study of hog farmers, USDA researchers reported 
that only 16% of surveyed hog farms did not use antibiotics at all.159 
The subtherapeutic use of antibiotics was statistically much more 
frequent on large farms under a production contract.160 It is not as if 
small hog farms avoid the use of antibiotics altogether. But the nature 
of hog farming is such that antibiotic use is much more necessary in 
the context of very large-scale farming. Some contract hog farmers 
 
153 Khanna et al., supra note 152, at 300 (finding that hog farmers never tested positive 
for a specific strain of MRSA unless the hogs also tested positive). 
154 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Opinion, How to Develop New Antibiotics, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 24, 2015, at A23; David A. Kessler, Opinion, Antibiotics and the Meat We Eat, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2013, at A27; Aude Teillant & Ramanan Laxminarayan, Economics of 
Antibiotic Use in U.S. Swine and Poultry Production, 30 CHOICES, First Quarter 2015, at 
4. 
155 Nigel Key & William D. McBride, Sub-therapeutic Antibiotics and the Efficiency of 
U.S. Hog Farms, 96 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 831, 838 tbl.1 (2014) (showing 3.3% of feeder-
to-finish farms using antibiotics for a single purpose, “growth promotion”). 
156 Id. at 840 n.13. 
157 G. Douglas Inglis et al., Effects of Subtherapeutic Administration of Antimicrobial 
Agents to Beef Cattle on the Prevalence of Antimocrobial Resistance in Campylobacter 
Jejuni and Campylobacter Hyointestinalis, 71 APPLIED ENVTL. MICROBIOLOGY 3872, 
3877 (2005); Marc Lipsitch et al., Antibiotics in Agriculture: When is it Time to Close the 
Barn Door?, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5752, 5754 (2002); Katherine M. Shea, 
Nontherapeutic Use of Antimicrobial Agents in Animal Agriculture: Implications for 
Pediatrics, 114 AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS 862, 862 (2004). 
158 The Food and Drug Administration has only recently moved to require disclosure of 
antimicrobial drug sales. Antimicrobial Animal Drug Sales and Distribution Reporting, 80 
Fed. Reg. 28,863, 28,863 (May 20, 2015) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314). 
159 Key & McBride, supra note 155, at 842 tbl.4. 
160 Id. 
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receive incentive payments based on feed conversion or low mortality 
rates.161 So while livestock farming’s share of the blame for the rise 
of antibiotic-resistant bacteria cannot be laid entirely on large hog 
CAFOs, the failure to regulate the administration of antibiotics to 
livestock fits very neatly into the game plan of large, vertically 
integrated livestock conglomerates. 
While the epidemiological link between the use of antibiotics in 
livestock and the emergence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria is not 
concrete, the evidence is strongly suggestive: antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria are commonly found on-site at CAFOs, found downwind and 
downstream, but not found at all upwind.162 Some antibiotics 
administered to livestock are in fact the same ones used to treat 
humans for life-threatening infections, and which have now lost their 
effectiveness.163 Following a ban in the European Union on the use of 
antibiotics for growth promotion, levels of antibiotic-resistant bacteria 
decreased.164 While the use of antibiotics by CAFOs cannot be 
completely blamed for the emergence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria 
and for human illness and death, there is very good reason to believe 
that the practice is a very significant contributing cause.165 
Even if antibiotic use for livestock is only weakly linked to the 
emergence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria, the shame is that this use is 
so unnecessary. In the 2009 survey of hog farmers by USDA 
researchers, almost half of those responding reported that they 
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283 (2003). 
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administered antibiotics at least in part for “growth promotion.”166 
This practice is a reckless endangerment of human health. But to put 
an exclamation point on the multidimensional foolishness of this 
practice, its contribution to productivity is paltry: the most recent 
study estimated a weight gain of about 1.0 to 1.3%.167 Hogs are 
scarcely 1% fatter for this practice, a vanishingly small advantage 
when weighed against the harms caused by antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria. Indeed, the effectiveness of antibiotics in boosting hog 
growth is highest in the presence of poor nutrition and otherwise poor 
conditions for hogs, simply because there is more disease for the 
antibiotics to treat.168 Antibiotics, as it turns out, work best as a 
substitute for competent management and humane treatment of 
animals. 
Certainly the administration of antibiotics to livestock has played a 
very significant role in the emergence of resistant strains. If even a 
small fraction of those two million Americans sickened and twenty-
three thousand dead every year from antibiotic-resistant bacterial 
infections could be attributed to hog farms, a cost-benefit analysis 
would reveal a vast differential between huge costs and miniscule 
benefits.169 
Perhaps even more alarming than the emergence of antibiotic-
resistant bacteria is the introduction of risk of interspecies pathogen 
transfer, for which hogs seem to serve as particularly helpful hosts.170 
The confinement of a large number of animals to a small area 
provides an excellent breeding ground for new viruses. Not only does 
the tight confinement of livestock make transmission more likely, but 
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it makes life stressful for animals and increases their vulnerability to 
disease.171 Moreover, farmers and farmworkers in CAFOs routinely 
deal with thousands of animals daily, a stark contrast to the much less 
intense interactions on small farms.172 The health threats to workers 
posed by CAFOs, combined with the higher likelihood of animal 
sickness in CAFOs, produces an especially heightened risk of 
interspecies transfer.173 The evolution of zoonotic disease into forms 
that infect humans has always been a game of chance, but the intense 
concentration of animals in tight quarters and the exposure of workers 
to new viruses is the equivalent of millions of additional rolls of the 
dice. 
This wanton overuse and misuse of antibiotics, and the crowded, 
industrialized farming it engenders, is a conscious policy choice. 
Banning the use of antibiotics in livestock, as hog-export power 
Denmark has done,174 would not only eliminate whatever 
responsibility hog farming bears for antibiotic-resistant bacteria, but 
also potentially discourage the overcrowded conditions that incubate 
dangerous zoonotic diseases that could transfer to humans. The Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) has legal authority to regulate “new 
animal drugs” if they are “unsafe.”175 The FDA considered doing so, 
going so far in 1973 as to require antibiotic manufacturers to provide 
any test results and “[b]y April 20, 1975, data satisfying all other 
specified criteria for safety and effectiveness,” and threatening the 
firms with withdrawal of approval of the drugs.176 This initiative went 
nowhere. It was not until 2012—thirty-seven years later—that the 
EPA announced a plan to work with drug makers to phase out the 
most dangerous practices,177 a plan that was promptly struck down by 
 
171 PEW, supra note 6, at 13. 
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Confined Animal Feeding Operations as Amplifiers of Influenza, 6 VECTOR-BORNE & 
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176 New Animal Drugs, 38 Fed. Reg. 9811, 9813 (proposed Apr. 20, 1973) (to be 
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a federal court as being insufficient.178 On appeal the Second Circuit 
reversed the district court, finding that the FDA’s regulation is a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute.179 As a result, the use of 
antibiotics for livestock not only continues, but shows an alarming 
increase.180 
An additional question should be asked: Even if the FDA somehow 
overcomes its long history of delaying regulation on the 
subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in livestock, is it worth allowing 
livestock in CAFOs to receive antibiotics at all? In the 2011 survey, 
hog farmers could have reported that, in addition to or instead of 
“growth promotion,” they used antibiotics for “disease treatment” 
and/or “disease prevention.”181 It is easy to imagine that when asked, 
hog farmers might minimize their guilt feelings by shading their 
responses away from the naked “growth promotion” answer. But even 
if these responses were to be taken at face value, so what? Separating 
out these responses creates distinctions without differences. Even 
“disease treatment” is a use of antibiotics that would not be necessary 
if hogs were not raised in the crowded, confined conditions of 
CAFOs. CAFOS create stressful conditions and cause more illness 
because infectious disease is transmitted more easily than on 
traditional, small-scale farms.182 In a sense, almost all administration 
of antibiotics to hogs in CAFOs is productivity enhancement. The 
point of administering antibiotics to hogs in large CAFOs is to take a 
traditional mortality that was low and squash that rate down to zero, 
even as the conditions for sickness intensify. That is a trivial benefit 
compared to the potential risks to the human population—particularly 
when the alternative is the raising of hogs on less-intense, small-scale 
farms. Again, in leaving hog farming alone, we have left hog farming 
to the large conglomerates. 
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(S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d, 760 F.3d 151, 166 (2d Cir. 2014). 
179 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 760 F.3d at 166. 
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E. Failure to Prevent Market Concentration Through Trade 
Regulation 
It should not be a surprise that a problem of industrial 
concentration in hog farming would have a substantial antitrust 
component. In many ways, hog farming is no different from other 
industries that have consolidated in recent years, such as commercial 
airlines, accounting firms, law firms, or broadband providers. 
However, trade practices in livestock are governed by the 1921 
Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA),183 not the Sherman Antitrust Act 
(Sherman Act).184 The PSA replaces, not supplements, the Sherman 
Act by excluding meatpacking from the terms of the Sherman Act.185 
The Sherman Act jurisprudence took a sharp laissez-faire turn with 
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., in which the United States Supreme Court 
declared that the Act was intended to be a “consumer welfare 
prescription.”186 Citing Robert Bork’s influential book, The Antitrust 
Paradox, the Court brushed aside nearly seven decades of 
jurisprudence and antitrust policy that was oriented towards 
preserving competition, rather than maximizing consumer welfare.187 
Under this new view, as long as consumer welfare is not reduced, 
almost any business practice survives Sherman Act scrutiny.188 
Bork’s noninterventionist view of the Sherman Act, strongly taken up 
by scholars at the University of Chicago,189 has been vigorously 
contested on normative grounds,190 but everyone agrees that, as a 
 
183 Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, ch. 64, tit. I, § 1, 42 Stat. 159 (1921) (current 
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descriptive matter, they have mostly won.191 Analysis under the 
Sherman Act is welfarist in nature, intervention has been infrequent, 
and consumer welfare has served a dominant criterion for evaluating 
the legality of trade practices.192 The question has been whether or 
not the PSA should be administered with the same lenience. If 
consumer surplus were the touchstone, then the consolidation of the 
hog industry, having produced more pork at lower prices, would 
likely be viewed as benign. 
In form, there appears to be less emphasis on consumer surplus 
under PSA than is the case under the Sherman Act. Case law arising 
under Section 202 of the PSA prohibits any “unfair, unjustly 
discriminatory, or deceptive practice or device”;193 “any undue or 
unreasonable preference[,] . . . advantage[,] . . . prejudice or 
disadvantage”;194 and “any course of business[,] . . . any act for the 
purpose or with the effect of manipulating or controlling prices, . . . of 
creating a monopoly . . . or of restraining commerce.”195 The question 
that has arisen under this section is whether a violation of Section 202 
has occurred if there has been no injury to competition.196 Most 
courts have held that an injury to competition must be found in order 
for an action under Section 202 to be maintained,197 which makes it 
harder to bring an enforcement action against some anticompetitive 
practice. But at least the inquiry focuses on the competition itself, 
rather than consumer surplus. 
In practice, the PSA has not served as much of a restraint on 
anticompetitive activity in the livestock industry. The Grain 
Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA), and its 
predecessor, the Packers and Stockyards Administration—agencies 
charged with administering the PSA and policing anticompetitive 
practices in the livestock industry198—have been uninterested in 
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challenging the consolidation of the livestock industry. The PSA was 
passed at a time in which five meatpacking companies had established 
an oligopsony199 and oligopoly200 (selling cuts of meat to distributors 
and supermarkets) that had the effect of raising meat prices.201 In 
1991, the General Accounting Office (GAO) noted that the 
meatpacking industry had become even more concentrated than the 
oligopsonist and oligopolist conditions in 1921 that gave impetus to 
the PSA: a mere four firms controlled 70% of the entire meatpacking 
industry.202 The GAO had stern words for the Packers and Stockyards 
Administration.203 The GAO strongly recommended that in light of 
the rapidly changing livestock industry, the agency quickly develop 
programs for monitoring and analyzing livestock industry practices, 
such as price manipulation and the apportioning of territory among 
meatpackers.204 The Packers and Stockyards Administration was not 
even collecting data on prices.205 
Six years later, the GAO, in following up on its 1991 report, noted 
that concentration had increased to 81% in 1995.206 It reiterated its 
1991 recommendations, noting that the newly-formed agency GIPSA 
“has begun reallocating its resources to place more emphasis on 
detecting anticompetitive violations,”207 but that progress was 
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disappointingly slow.208 Another ten years later, an audit by the 
USDA Inspector General not only found shockingly little progress by 
GIPSA in setting up monitoring and data collection systems,209 but 
found a treasure trove of new instances of incompetence and 
indifference to anticompetitive behavior. Out of the listed 1,842 
investigations on file, GIPSA could not even identify the location of 
the investigation in 1,799 of those files (apparently, it could with the 
remaining forty-three).210 The Inspector General found that the 
relationship between management and staff was strained, 
“significantly contribut[ing] to the agency not being able to ensure 
open and competitive markets for livestock, meat, and poultry.”211 
Shockingly and tellingly, staff economists, who should be at the 
forefront of an agency charged with analyzing markets, were 
marginalized and frozen out of investigations into anticompetitive 
practices and effects on trade.212 This was true despite the 1997 
recommendation that had specifically suggested that economists be 
brought into the investigative processes and policy.213 
While the 1994 reorganization that created GIPSA was disruptive, 
it is hard to explain away the subsequent two-decade-long chaos that 
has reigned over the agency since. Certainly a trade regulation agency 
that has marginalized its economists would appear to be one that is 
uninterested in carrying out its economic mandate. Under the watch 
of GIPSA and its predecessor agency, the market share of the top four 
pork packers increased from 40% in 1990 to 66% in 2007.214 Beef 
packing is even more concentrated, with the top four producers 
owning 83.5% of the market in 2007.215 Three of the top four hog 
packers are also the top three beef packers—Tyson Foods, Swift & 
Co., and Cargill—while the top pork packer is the behemoth 
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Smithfield Foods, which slaughters over twenty-seven million hogs 
per year, good for 26% of the total market.216 
The legislative history of the PSA suggests that Congress was 
concerned with protecting competition, not consumer surplus.217 In 
going beyond the Sherman Act, the PSA can be read as encompassing 
a broader set of values than just the consumer surplus standards which 
dominates the Sherman Act jurisprudence.218 It is true that the 
Sherman Act has become a welfarist statute despite a legislative 
history that is lacking any hint of a Congressional welfarist 
concern.219 But in passing the PSA, Congress had an important 
constituency in mind: farmers.220 Unlike Sherman Act problems, the 
livestock industry has a long-standing and identifiable group with a 
vested and articulable interest in competitive markets for their own 
sake. While “consumers” may be too large and nebulous a group to 
have a proxy, small farms are not. The existence of small farms 
throughout the course of passage and amendments of the PSA shows 
that Congress recognized the interests of this constituency and passed 
the PSA with that group in mind. 
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III 
WHY SAVING SMALL FARMS MATTERS 
The intensification and concentration of agriculture has clearly 
produced gains for both producers and consumers. A farmer in 1940 
did well to harvest seventy to eighty bushels of corn per acre, but corn 
farmers today routinely harvest two hundred bushels per acre.221 
Livestock farming has seen even more impressive gains. In 1950, 
chickens took an average of eighty-four days to grow to five pounds; 
by 2005, that period had shortened to forty-five days.222 This has 
translated into savings for consumers: in 1970, the average American 
spent over 4% of her income on 194 pounds of meat; by 2005, she 
spent about 2% of her income on 221 pounds.223 But in addition to 
increasing air and water pollution and contributing to public health 
risks, an intensified and concentrated agricultural sector imposes 
other costs on society that would be avoided by a more diffuse sector 
that decentralizes production on a larger number of smaller farms. 
On one level, saving small farms is just a proxy for reducing the 
enormous environmental and social costs of large-scale farming. 
Whether or not small farms could be saved from the rigors of 
competition, it is worth forcing large farms to internalize the 
environmental and social costs they impose on society. However 
impressive are the gains in productivity and profit, they are still 
eclipsed by the heartbreakingly large number of human deaths, 
illnesses, and catastrophic health risks, and a large variety of other 
costs of large-scale farming. The regulatory gaps that allow CAFOs to 
thrive in such great numbers are egregiously inefficient, in that 
consumers, if they could choose, would be willing to pay more for 
meat in exchange for relief from the multitude of problems generated 
by industrialized agriculture. Moreover, along with exacerbating 
environmental and social ills, we are destroying a much more benign 
model of food production and losing the human and social capital that 
is required to maintain it. There are significant irreversibilities in 
going down this path. 
Conglomerates have essentially become more efficient by 
substituting capital for labor, employing fewer people at the local 
level, and substituting some different management techniques that 
save on labor costs. What little labor industrialized agriculture adds is 
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apt to reside in some central headquarters where complex decisions 
are made regarding inventory, flow, feedstock, and other factors that 
are efficiently woven together. But this concentration of productive 
inputs away from the individual and toward the centralized 
conglomerate reduces the demand for labor at the local level and the 
human capital traditionally required to farm.224 There may be a great 
many other factors, but as large employers in agricultural 
communities, farms clearly exert an influence on employment 
patterns.225 There is no doubt that one of the efficiencies realized by 
large conglomerates is the ability to pay fewer people at the local 
level. To a great extent, this is the normal evolution of an industry as 
it reduces costs. There is no denying that more people have more 
access to meat now than was the case just a few decades ago. 
However, a hidden cost in the process is the loss of social and human 
capital in those rural agricultural communities.226 
The human capital of farming on a small scale may seem 
anachronistic, but it remains a vital part of a functioning economy. 
The groundbreaking human capital scholar Theodore Schultz noted 
that farmers made extremely efficient utilization of the technologies 
available to them.227 In Schultz’s 1979 Nobel Prize lecture, The 
Economics of Being Poor, he denounced what he perceived as the 
widespread condescension toward farmers: “People who are rich find 
it hard to understand the behaviour of poor people. Economists are no 
exception, for they too find it difficult to comprehend the preferences 
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and scarcity constraints that determine the choices that poor people 
make.”228 
Being a farmer not only requires hard physical labor, but also 
requires underappreciated ingenuity in the face of binding economic 
constraints and a great deal of inherent commodity risk.229 For 
decades, fewer people have chosen this line of work.230 To be sure, 
the migration of jobs and people from agricultural communities has a 
multitude of macroeconomic causes well beyond the scope of this 
Article that have nothing to do with concentration in agriculture.231 
But the rise of industrialized agriculture is predicated on the 
replacement of the human capital of traditional farming, which is a 
substantial source of the cost savings.232 CAFOs with market power 
drive down the wages that need to be paid to contract growers, who 
no longer make the farm management decisions.233 But this model of 
agricultural production ignores a wide variety of broader societal 
considerations, reviewed in this Article and externalized by large 
agricultural conglomerates. 
Additionally, agriculture’s march toward concentration will destroy 
the social capital resident in traditionally agricultural communities. 
Social capital is the network of interpersonal and intra-organizational 
bonds that are formed through cooperation or expected cooperation. 
Robert Putnam’s pioneering Bowling Alone, argues that social capital 
enhances political and civic life without consciously having these 
outcomes as objectives.234 But possibly even more important, social 
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capital can play a vital role in increasing productivity235 in poor, 
resource-based communities such as fishing communities.236 In poor, 
resource-based communities that lack either physical or human 
capital, social capital provides valuable informational benefits, 
lubricates mercantile relations, and dispenses with the need for 
expensive and perhaps futile monitoring.237 To the extent that large 
agricultural conglomerates are drying up agricultural communities,238 
they are wasting this reserve of social capital. 
Finally, there is one more vital role for small farms that must be 
preserved: the presentation of choice to consumers. With almost 90% 
of chickens produced under contract and 90% of hogs slaughtered by 
large plants,239 it has become increasingly difficult for meat 
consumers to obtain meat that is anything but low-quality, low-cost, 
and produced under poor conditions. Markets for premium meat 
products exist, but are consigned to niche market status.240 It is 
important to learn lessons from concentration in other industries that 
have consolidated and generated tremendous consumer displeasure. 
Complaints about commercial air travel in an industry dominated by 
three legacy carriers has only increased241 as the industry marches 
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towards a duopoly. If livestock conglomerates are following the 
example of the commercial airlines, they are clearly misguided, to say 
the least. But the greatest costs will take the form of lost consumer 
surplus resulting from the loss of choice. 
Saving small farms matters because agricultural production by 
large agricultural conglomerates carries many different price tags, 
each too high for the value it adds. Saving small farms also matters 
because it is important to maintain an agricultural industry that is 
robust, diverse, and healthy. Small is not necessarily beautiful, or 
healthier, or environmentally better, but small, traditional farms are 
much less likely to impose the scale externalities imposed by large 
farms. 
CONCLUSION 
It would appear that wealth and power in the agricultural sector has 
become increasingly concentrated, much the way that wealth has 
concentrated generally in most developed economies. The external 
costs imposed by large agricultural conglomerates, and hog CAFOs in 
particular, are shocking and should be a policy reform priority. Hog 
CAFOs are a bane of any community: they cause property 
devaluation of land within several miles, they pollute water in 
unacceptable quantities, and they pollute air enough to pose a 
significant threat to public health. It is disgraceful that regulators have 
allowed CAFOs to impose these health risks upon the broader public 
and allowed them to incubate the development of antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria and zoonotic viruses. 
This Article emphasizes not just the externalities of CAFOs, but 
the broader question of what kind of industry structure best serves 
both consumers and the general public. Industry concentration 
commonly increases consumer surplus. But this is a very narrow 
benefit. A variety of other social and environmental considerations 
belong in the calculus of any production decision—in any industry. 
The problem with industry concentration, and particularly the 
concentration of hog CAFOs, is that the parsimony of cost 
minimization has driven out all other considerations, many of them 
vastly more important than just consumer price. 
What kind of an agricultural industry can better internalize its 
social and environmental costs? It would be a trap to romanticize the 
bucolic farm life. Agricultural communities have always been poor, 
and college-educated individuals have always been less common on 
farms than in other places in American industry. But this is a social 
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construct: low commodity prices means low pay, which means that 
young workers have a higher payout if they leave the farm to pursue 
higher education. What this social construct elides is the need to 
produce food without also producing a panoply of other problems. 
That is a more demanding task, one which requires a more developed 
human capital, building on an existing base of farming knowledge 
that already embodies far more wisdom in environmental stewardship 
than agricultural conglomerates possess. And yet, more is required to 
place agriculture in a larger social context of a more complex menu of 
needs other than just food provision. Reform of public policy to avoid 
excusing environmental, health, and economic harms arising from 
agricultural practices would represent a much-needed start to the long 
but necessary process of reassembling an agricultural industry that 
has lost its way. 
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